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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Plaintiff and Petitioner, )
)
V. )
~ )
MARK C., et al., )
Defendants and Respondents. )
)
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal Froin the Judgment of the Superior Court 
of the State of California, County of Orange 
The Honorable Richard N. Parslow, Jr., Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, Division Three
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
This is an action to determine who are the legal parents, 
under the Uniform Parentage Act, California Civil Code sections 
7000-7021, of a child developed from the sperm and egg of a 
married couple, but who was carried and delivered by a 
gestational surrogate. On August 15, 1990, in the Orange County 
superior Court, Mark and Crispina C. filed petitions to declare 
the existence of a parent-child relationship between themselves 
and their unborn child, (C.T. 8), and to appoint a guardian ad 
litem for the child, (C.T. 1). The trial court appointed the 
C.'s guardians ad litem that same day. (C.T. 64.) On September 
13, 1990, the trial court appointed William Steiner as an 
independent guardian ad litem, (C.T. 169), upon an August 27, 
1990, motion by Anna J., the gestational surrogate, (C.T. 65), 
and pursuant to stipulation, (C.T. 136). The C.'s moved for an 
award of interim custody upon the birth of the child on September
1
19, 1990. (C.T. 234.) This motion was granted on September 27,
1990. (C.T. 334.)
On October 4, 1990, Anna J. filed a First Amended Complaint 
for declaratory relief and petitioned for custody of the child 
and for sibling rights for her natural daughter. (C.T. 346.)
The suits were consolidated. On October 22, 1990, the trial 
court ruled from the bench without a jury that Mark and Crispina 
C. are the child's genetic, natural, and legal parents. (R.T. 
1482-83.) The judge also ruled that Anna J. is not the child's 
natural mother and has no parental rights. (R.T. 1500.) Anna J. 
appealed to the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 
Division Three. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of the 
-superior Court below. ann;. .7. v. Mark_C^, 6 Cal. App. 4th 521 
(1991). Anna J. was granted review by this court.
Statement of Facts
Mark and Crispina C. are a married couple. (R.T. 1481.) 
Because of a hysterectomy, Crispina is unable to bear a child, 
but her ovaries are healthy and she is able to produce healthy 
eggs. (R.T. 1200.) Despite Crispina's inability to carry a 
fetus, the C.'s desired to have a child and investigated the
possibility of a surrogacy arrangement. (R.T. 1201.)
Anna J. is a nurse at western-Medical Center, as is Crispina 
C. (R.T. 784.) Anna has never married, but she has one natural 
daughter. (R.T. 786.)- In April 1989 Anna looked into serving as 
a surrogate. (R.T. 781.) Upon hearing that the C.'s were 
looking for a surrogate, Anna volunteered her services. (R.T.
784.)
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The surrogacy arrangement called for a child to be conceived 
of Mark C.'s sperm and Crispina C.'s egg, and for the zygote to 
be implanted in Anna J.'s womb, where it would grow until birth. 
(C.T. 11-30.) At that time, Mark and Crispina C., the genetic 
pareivts, would assume custody of their child. (R.T. 831-) Anna 
J. was to be paid a $10,000 stipend in installments, and her 
uninsured medical expenses were to be reimbursed. (C.T. 31.) In 
addition, the C.'s offered to purchase a life insurance policy 
for Anna J., with Anna J.'s daughter as beneficiary. (R.T. 768- 
72.) The agreement between the C.'s and Anna J. was reduced to a 
written contract and executed on January 15, 1990. (C.T. 11-32.)
Before this surrogacy arrangement, Anna J. suffered several 
•miscarriages. (R.T. 786). However, the C.'s did not learn about 
the miscarriages until after their child was implanted. (R.T. 
1213.) Approximately seven months after implantation, Anna sent 
a letter to the C.'s demanding early payment of her remaining 
stipend, with a threat to refuse to transfer custody of the baby 
to the C.'s. (C.T. 33-35.) Anna claimed in her letter that she
needed the money early because her landlord was selling her house 
and she would have to move. (C.T. 33.) In fact, Anna's roommate 
had asked her to move out, (R.T. 1314), and Anna owed a 
substantial welfare fraud debt, (R.T. 806-07, 1311-12).
A baby boy was delivered on September 19, 1990. (R.T.
1482.) He was identified on his birth certificate as Baby Boy 
J., but the C.'s named him Christopher. (R.T. 1301.) Human 
Leucocyte Antigen (HLA) blood tests confirm that Mark and 
crispina C. are the genetic parents of Christopher, and prove 
that Anna J. is not the genetic mother. (R.T. 1482-83.)
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Are a husband and wife who conceive a child through in 
vitro fertilization, and who, because they are unable to carry 
that child themselves, enlist the assistance of a gestational 
surrogate, the exclusive natural and legal parents under the 
Uniform Parentage Act?
2. Do parents who strive to maintain a parental 
relationship with their genetic offspring have a constitutional 
right to be legally held the natural and legal parents?
3. Is it sound public policy to hold a married couple who 
enlists the assistance of a gestational surrogate the exclusive 
natural and legal parents of their genetic offspring?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mark and Crispina C. are the natural and legal parents of 
Christopher, because they are his genetic parents and he was 
conceived with the intention that Mark and Crispina C. be his 
genetic parents.
The Uniform Parentage Act, as codified in California as 
sections 7000 through 7021 of the Civil Code, applies to this 
case and establishes Mark and Crispina C. as the genetic, 
natural, and legal parents of Christopher. According to the 
intent of the parties and California law, Mark C, is not a sperm 
donor and Crispina C. is not an egg donor. In fact, their status 
as natural and legal parents is entirely consistent with the 
scheme of the Uniform Parentage Act.
In addition, Mark and Crispina C. have a constitutional 
right to be declared the natural and legal parents of 
Christopher. The C.'s have a liberty interest in being the legal
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parents of their genetic child, because they have never acted to 
abandon their parental roles. Because Mark C. is not a sperm 
donor and is therefore the legal father, equal protection 
requires that Crispina C. is the legal mother, because she is 
situated similarly. Anna J.'s privacy right concerning her body 
during her pregnancy does not extend to a parental right after 
pregnancy. California is constitutionally entitled to determine 
that a married couple who are genetic parents are natural and 
legal parents, and that a gestational surrogate is not a legal 
parent.
The statutory and constitutional determination that Mark and 
Crispina C. are the natural and legal parents of Christopher is 
also the soundest policy. Parental status should be determined 
by the intent to create and raise a child. Legislative acts by 
our state and by our sister states support this policy.
It is therefore just that this Court declare Mark, Crispina, 
and Christopher C. to be a natural and legal family.
ARGUMENT
Are you my mommy? This deceptively simple question 
defies simple answer in the age of modern reproductive 
technology.
We have a technology that takes [Crispina's]^ egg and 
places it into [Anna's] body. [S]o we may ask, who is 
the mommy? Who is the surrogate? Is [Anna] 
substituting for [Crispina's] body, growing 
[Crispina's] baby for her?, or is [Crispina's] egg 
substituting for [Anna's], growing into [Anna's] baby 
in [Anna's] body?
’ Parties* names are substituted for the hypothetical names in the 
original article.
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B. Katz-Rothman, Recreating Motherhood: Ideology & Technology in 
a Patriarchal Society. 44 (1989) (quoted in John L. Hill, Wh^
noes it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of Biology as the Basis 
fnr Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 388 (1991)).
Up until now when courts have been asked to determine the 
custody of a child there has been no question as to who is the 
child's "natural” mother. Anna J., 6 Cal. App- 4th at 525. This 
case squarely presents the novel question: who is the child s 
"natural”, and therefore, "legal" mother under California law in 
a case of gestational surrogacy? It is a case of first 
impression for California and the entire country.
The traditional understanding is that a woman who gives 
birth to a child is that child's natural mother. However, where 
as here a child is begotten through the modern reproductive 
technology of gestational surrogacy, the matter is not so clear.
Here the natural parents are Mark and Crispina C, , who 
carefully and intentionally orchestrated the procreational act, 
bringing together all the necessary components with the intention 
of creating a unique individual whom they intend to raise as
their own.
The facts of the case are undisputed, and this appeal solely 
raises questions of law.
T ACCORDING TO THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, MARK AND CRISPINA
C. THE GENETIC PARENTS OF CHRISTOPHER, ARE HIS NATURE AND 
■ LEGAL PARENTS, AND THEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT OF THE LOWER 
COURT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.
Questions of law are reviewed under the non-deferential de 
novo or independent standard of review. People v. Louis, 42 Cal.
3d 969, 985 (1986).
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A. The Uniform Parentage Act On Its Face Supports The
Trial Court's Findings That Anna J. Is Not 
Christopher *s Natural Mother. Because The Act Defines
Parentage By The Undisputed Blood Test Results Which
Prove Anna J. Has No Genetic Relationship To
Christopher.
The parent and child relationship in California is ~ 
determined by operation of the Uniform Parentage Act (Act), 
adopted by the California Legislature in 1975. Cal. Civ. Code 
§§ 7000-7021 (West Supp, 1992). The Act*s stated purpose is to 
eliminate the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate 
children in California and create rights and duties associated 
with the parent-child relationship without regard to such 
distinctions. See Legis. Counsel's Dig. of SB 347 (1975 Reg. 
Sess.).
The Act defines the "parent and child relationship" as "the 
legal relationship existing between a child and his natural or 
adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes 
rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. It includes the 
mother and child relationship and the father and child 
relationship." Cal. Civ. Code § 7001 (West Supp. 1992). Because 
Mark and Crispina C. are the genetic parents of Christopher, they 
are the "natural" parents of Christopher, and therefore his legal 
parents under the Act,
Before it was possible for one woman to carry another 
woman's fertilized egg, the woman who gave birth to the child was 
the child's natural and genetic mother. The Act recognizes this 
biological fact: "The parent and child relationship mav be 
established . . . [b]etween a child and the natural mother . . . 
by proof of her having given birth to the child . . . Cal.
7
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TheCiv. Code § 7003(1) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).^ 
statute says that motherhood "may be" established by giving 
birth. It does not say "is established" or "shall be 
established." "'Shall* is mandatory and 'may* is permissive." 
Cal.'Tvid. Code § 11 (West Supp. 1992). Furthermore, section 
7003(1) completes the sentence with "or under this part." Giving 
birth is only one way that status as a legal mother can be 
established in California. See Hill, supra, at 370 (gestation is 
not the sine qua non of motherhood) .
Historically, status as a genetic or natural father has been 
more difficult to determine than status as a genetic or natural 
mother, because the identity of the man who fertilized the 
-woman's egg is not always known at birth. The Act provides for 
various means of determining who is a natural father, and 
"[i]nsofar as practicable," these provisions apply to determine 
who is a natural mother. Cal. Civ. Code § 7015 (West Supp.
1992)
^ The full section provides:
The parent and child relationship may be established as 
follows:
(1) Between a child and the natural mother it may be 
established by proof of her having given birth to the
child, or under this part.
(2) Between a child and the natural father it may be 
established under'this part.
(3) Between a child and an adoptive parent it may be 
established by proof of adoption.
Id.
^ "Any interested party may bring an action to_determine the
existence or nonexistence of a mother and child_relationship.
Insofar as practicable, the provisions of this part applicable to 
the father and child relationship apply." Id. (emphasis added).
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According to the Act, giving birth does not conclusively 
determine the natural mother. The fundamental rule of statutory 
interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent. People v. 
aston. 39 cal. 3d 481, 489 (1985). To determine intent, courts 
look fTrst to the words themselves. People__v. Woodhead, -43 Cal.
3d 1002, 1007 (1987). If the statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous the plain meaning of the statute must be followed. 
r-;.lifnrnia Teachers Ass'n v. San Diego Community College Dist^,
28 cal. 3d 692, 698 (1981). However, it is "presumed that the 
Legislature adopts legislation with the intent and meaning 
expressed in committee reports." Southland Mechanical 
r-,.„..1-rnctors Coro. V. Nixen, 119 Cal. App. 3d 417, 427 (1981), 
nverruled on other grounds by Laird v. Blacker, 2 Cal. 4th 606,
617 (1992). The committee reports accompanying the adoption of 
the Act state that the Act "cover[s] the rare case in which there 
may be uncertainty as to the mother, [as] the bill [SB 347] 
provides a procedure whereby the mother may be determined." See 
Legis. counsel's Dig. of SB 347 cmt. 3, at 15 (1975 Reg. Sess.)- 
Where the genetic mother does not give birth, there is 
uncertainty as to the identity of the mother, and the Act
applies.
Governor Wilson's recent veto of the Alternative 
Reproduction Act of 1992 provides additional support for this 
conclusion. The governor acts in a legislative capacity when 
considering bills passed by the Legislature and presented to him 
for approval or veto, and his public statements on such bills are 
pertinent to the subject of legislative intent. See People v.. 
Tanner. 24 Cal. 3d 514, 520 (1979). In his veto message.
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Governor Wilson said that "surrogate parenting can be governed by 
the legal framework already established in the family law area." 
Bill Ainsworth, Ban On Surrogacy Vowed As Regulations Are Vetoed, 
The Recorder, Sept. 29, 1992, at 1. The Governor*s statement 
supports the conclusion that the Act applies to the present case.
According to the Act, "[a] man is presumed to be the natural 
father of a child if he meets the conditions as set forth in 
Section 621 of the Evidence Code . . . Cal. Civ, Code
§ 7004(a) (West Supp. 1992). Taking section 7015 and section 
7004(a) together, section 621 of the Evidence Code determines the 
natural mother. Section 621(a) of the Evidence Code provides: 
"Except as provided in subdivision (b) , the issue of a wife 
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is 
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage." Cal. Evid. 
Code § 621(a) (West Supp. 1992). Christopher is the genetic 
issue of Mark and Crispina C, , who are married and cohabiting. 
Therefore, Christopher is conclusively presumed to be a child of
Mark and Crispina C.'s marriage.
Section 621(b) of the Evidence Code provides for rebuttal of
section 621(a)'s presumption by blood test evidence.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a) , if the court 
finds that the conclusions of all the experts, as 
disclosed by the evidence based upon blood tests 
performed pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with 
Section 890) of Division 7, are that the husband is not 
the father of the child, the question of paternity of 
the husband shall be resolved accordingly.
Cal. Evid. Code § 621(b) (West Supp. 1992) (emphasis added). In
the case of Mark and Crispina C. , blood tests confirm that they
are the genetic and natural parents. (C.T. 666; R.T. 1482.)
Therefore, under both sections 621(a) and (b) of the Evidence
10
code, Mark and Crispina c. are the natural parents of 
Christopher.
Section 621(e) of the Evidence Code does not contradict this 
conclusion. Section 621(e) provides: "Subdivision (b) shall not 
apply to any case coming within Section 7005 of the Civil Code, 
or to any case in which the wife, with the consent of the 
husband, conceived by means of a surgical procedure." Cal. Evid. 
Code § 621(e) (West Supp. 1992). First, section 621(e) does not 
apply to Mark and Crispina C. Section 7005 of the Civil Code and 
section 621(e) of the Evidence Code concern the parent-child 
relationship in the case of a sperm donor or an egg donor.
Neither Mark nor Crispina is a donor. See infra, part I.B.
Second, even if section 621(e) did apply to this case, it would 
merely deny the application of section 621(b) and make section 
621(a) control. Section 621(a) declares that one spouse is 
presumed to be the parent of the other spouse's issue. Mark is 
neither impotent nor sterile. Christopher is the issue of both 
Mark and Crispina, who cohabit as husband and wife.
Anna J. argues that section 7003(a) establishes herself as 
the natural mother because she gave birth to the child. 
Historically, a woman who gave birth to a child was the natural 
mother because she was also the genetic mother. However, where 
blood test results prove otherwise, they control. When specific 
provisions contradict general provisions in the law, specific 
provisions control. County of Santa Clara v. Deputy Sheriff's 
Ass'n. No. S023350, 1992 WL 314002 at *5 (Cal. Nov. 2, 1992); San 
Francisco Taxpayers Ass'n v. Board of Supervisors, 2 Cal. 4th 
571, 577 (1992); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1859 (West Supp. 1992)
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("when a general and more particular provision are inconsistent, 
the latter is paramount to the former”).
B. Mark And Crispina C« Are Not Germ Cell Donors And Are
Therefore Christopher’s Natural And Legal Parents.
Anna J. argues that section 7005 conclusively precludes Mark 
C. from being Christopher’s natural father because he is a sperm 
donor. Section 7005 states that "the donor of semen provided to 
a licensed physician for use in artificial insemination of a 
woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were 
not the natural father of a child thereby conceived." Cal. Civ, 
Code § 7005(b) (West Supp. 1992). Anna misstates the facts.
Mark C. is not a semen donor.
Mark gave his semen to a physician so that the egg of his 
wife could be fertilized and implanted in Anna J. , enabling Mark 
and Crispina to have a child genetically related to them both. 
(C.T. 8, 14.) Mark never intended to be a "donor," By its very 
terms, section 7005 does not apply to this situation. Mark C, 
did not "donate" any semen to inseminate a woman not his wife. 
Mark’s wife, Crispina, is the woman whose egg was inseminated.
Section 7005 provides individuals with legal means to obtain 
semen without fear that the donor might claim paternity, and 
provides semen donors with legal protection enabling them to 
donate their semen without fear of liability for child support. 
Jhordan C. v. Mary K. . 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 392 (1986).
The Legislature adopted this interpretation by choosing not 
to alter section 7005 when it amended the statute in 1990 and 
1991. The reenactment of a statute in substantially the same 
language after it has been judicially construed gives rise to a 
presumption of legislative adoption, acquiescence, or
ratification of that construction. Holmes v. McColgant 17 Cal. 
2d 426 (1941); Marina Point Ltd, v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 734 
(1982). "[T]he Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing 
laws and judicial decisions in effect at the time legislation is 
[amend^] and to have . . . amended statutes in light of -such 
decisions as have a direct bearing upon them." People v. 
Overstreet, 42 Cal. 3d 891, 897 (1986). Therefore, the 
Legislature, being deemed aware of the interpretation enunciated 
in .Thordan C. when it amended the law in 1990 and 1991, and not 
having made any relevant changes, must be presumed to have 
approved or ratified such interpretation.
Because Mark and Crispina C. intended to be the legal 
parents when they combined their sperm and eggs, they are not 
donors.
C. Finding Mark And Crispina C. The Natural And Legal
Parents Of Christopher Is Consistent With The Entire 
Scheme Of The Uniform Parentage Act^
"Statutes should be construed so as to harmonize with the 
entire scheme of law." Clean Air Constituency v. California 
state Air Resource Bd., 11 Cal, 3d 801, 814 (1974).
The old common law rule, that a child of a wife cohabiting 
with her husband shall be conclusively presumed the child of the 
marriage, served to ensure the legitimization of the child in an 
era when illegitimacy carried with it terrible social stigma and
severe legal consequences. Hill, supra, at 373.
"[A]ppeals to traditional definitions are of little use in 
answering what is essentially a normative question: who should 
be considered the parent in collaborative-reproduction 
arrangements?" at 373. The common use of a term may be
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ambiguous, lacking clear boundaries, and have conflicting 
meanings. Id. at 361. For the phrase "natural mother" the very 
fact that common usage is unclear in cases arising under modern 
reproductive technology makes reliance on such usage in this case 
particularly unwise. ~
"[T]he problem with finding a purely formal definition of 
'parent* is that the formal definition ignores the social, moral, 
and legal contingencies which have shaped our social intuitions 
about parenthood." Id. at 362. For example, in our society 
adoptive parents are legal parents. A child's adoptive mother is 
considered her actual and legal mother even though the adoptive 
mother does not satisfy the common law or traditional definition 
-of mother that Anna J. would have the Court apply to this case. 
This argument is lacking in substance and ultimately begs the 
question of motherhood under these facts.
The Act was adopted to eradicate the stigmas associated with 
illegitimacy. Legis. Counsel's Dig. of SB 347 (1975 Reg. Sess.). 
Subsequently, the conclusive presumption of legitimacy was 
modified to incorporate modern reproductive technology (e.g., 
artificial insemination) into the scheme of the law. California 
Evidence Code section 621 first subordinates the presumption of 
legitimacy to blood test results proving that the alleged parent 
has no genetic link to the child, and second requires a finding 
of non-parenthood in such a case. See Cal. Evid. Code § 621 
(West Supp. 1992).
The Act expressly allows for the modern reproductive 
technology of artificial insemination. The Legislature has 
expressed itself about one procedure for medically assisted
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conception while remaining silent about others. To this extent 
the Legislature puts its stamp of approval on using modern 
reproductive technologies to assist childless couples to 
conceive. The fact that the statute expressly sanctions one way 
of doTng this does not rule out other ways by implication. 
Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth. 704 S.W.2d 209, 212 
(Ky. 1986) (holding surrogate contract not violative of state law 
prohibiting payment of money for adoption) . Finding Mark and 
Crispina C. the legal parents of Christopher is consistent with 
this scheme of the law as set out in the Act.
II. THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT THIS COURT
DECLARE MARK AND CRISPINA C. THE NATURAL AND LEGAL PARENTS
OF CHRISTOPHER.
Constitutional considerations require a finding that Mark 
and Crispina C. are the natural and legal parents of Christopher 
under the Uniform Parentage Act.
The court must interpret a statute in a manner consistent 
with the federal Constitution. California Housing Fin. Agency v. 
Elliott, 17 Cal. 3d 575, 594 (1976). The Constitution guarantees 
parental rights for genetic parents unless they act to relinquish 
those rights or they are proved unfit. Further, because Mark C. 
is unquestionably a genetic, natural, and legal parent of 
Christopher, equal protection doctrine guarantees that his wife 
Crispina C. is also a genetic, natural, and legal parent of 
Christopher. Anna J. has no constitutional claim to be adjudged 
a natural or legal parent because she is not a genetic parent. 
Even if Anna J. did have constitutionally protected interests, 
the Constitution would not be offended by California*s
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determination that Mark and Crispina C. are the natural and legal 
parents of Christopher.
A. Mark And Crispina C. Must Be Declared The Natural And 
Legal Parents Of Christopher, Because The Fourteenth 
Amendment To The United States Constitution Guarantees 
Parental Rights To Married Genetic Parents, Absent 
Relinquishment Of Parental Rights Or Clear And— 
Convincing Evidence Of Unfitness.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects the right to marry and
have children. It guarantees parental rights to genetic parents
unless they sleep on their rights or are found to be unfit.
Liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes,
'■[w]ithout doubt, . . . the right of the individual to contract,
to marry, [and to] establish a home and bring up children,
|4g>Yer v. Nebraska. 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding
unconstitutional a Nebraska statute prohibiting the teaching of
foreign languages to young children) ; see al^ Cleveland Bd. of
PHnr-. V. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) (holding
unconstitutional requirements that pregnant teachers take leaves
of absence four or five months before expected delivery)
(“freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment").*
Marriage and family are our society's most important
institutions.
Marriage is a coming together for bettor or for worse, 
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way ot 
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
‘ "NO State shall . . • deprive any person of . . . liberty . . . 
without due process of law V.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
California's constitutional protection is similar: "A person may 
not be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law 
. . . Cal. Const, art. 1, § 7(a).
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faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social 
projects.
r,riswold V- Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). "[T]he 
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family . . • because
the instritution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation*s 
history and tradition. It is through the family that we 
inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral 
and cultural." Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 
(1977) (holding unconstitutional a city ordinance prohibiting a 
grandmother from living with her two grandsons who were cousins) .
The Constitution protects procreative rights. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding unconstitutional 
Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act); Stanley y^,
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding unconstitutional an 
Illinois presumption that unwed fathers are unfit parents).
Interfering with the reproductive choices of a married couple is 
"repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485—86.
The Constitution protects the relationship between a parent 
and genetic offspring. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 
(1973) (holding unconstitutional a Texas common-law rule that 
only natural fathers of legitimate children may be held liable 
for the children's support); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 
U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (finding a "fundamental liberty interest of 
natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their 
child"). For example, in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979),
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together unmarried and had 
two children. Id^ at 382. Mohammed took the children to live 
with another man, whom she married. Id^ Caban also married, and
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both couples endeavored to adopt the children. Id. at 383. The
United states Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York 
statute requiring consent of only the mother of illegitimate 
children- in adoption, thereby protecting the parental rights of a 
genetic father. Id. at 382.
The California Supreme Court recently affirmed the 
constitutional right to a relationship with genetic offspring in 
an adoption case. Adoption of Kelsev S. . 1 Cal. 4th 816, 821 
(1992). Kari S. and Rickie M. had a child out of wedlock and 
Kari sought to relinquish the child for adoption by another 
couple. Id. at 821-22. The California Supreme Court determined 
that Rickie had a right under the federal Constitution to 
withhold his consent to the adoption. Id. at 849. "The 
biological connection between father and child is unique and 
worthy of constitutional protection if the father grasps the 
opportunity to develop that biological connection into a full and 
enduring relationship." Id. at 838.
Children may be removed from genetic parents who are married 
to each other only upon clear and convincing evidence of 
unfitness. Santoskv. 455 U.S. at 747-48. Absent a showing of 
unfitness, the United States Supreme Court has never ruled 
against the interests of a genetic parent, except in favor of the 
other genetic parent and her husband. Anna J. is not a genetic 
parent and she has no husband.
Leon Quilloin and Ardell Walcott had a child out of wedlock. 
Ouilloin V. Walcott. 434 U.S. 246, 247, reh'q denied, 435 U.S,
918 (1978) . They never established a home together and Walcott 
always retained custody of their child. Id. Walcott
subsequently married another man, who wished to adopt her son.
Id. The United States Supreme Court upheld Georgia's denial of 
Quilloin's petition to block the adoption, noting that he never 
attempted to legitimize the child until the child was eleven 
years old and Walcott petitioned to adopt her. Id. at 248^1.
The Court expressed a strong preference for families to be 
composed of married couples and their children. Id_^ at 255.
Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Robertson conceived a child, 
Jessica, out of wedlock. Lehr v. Robertson. 463 U.S. 248, 250 
(1983). Lorraine subsequently married another man who wished to 
adopt the child. Id. The adoption was approved by New York's 
Family Court, and Lehr challenged the adoption because he was not 
given notice of the proceedings. Id. The New York courts 
determined that notice was not required because Lehr never 
established a substantial relationship with Jessica, nor did he 
register his status as father with New York's putative father 
registry. Id. at 250-52. The United States Supreme Court held 
New York's determinations constitutional. Id. at 268.
Nevertheless, the Court found a constitutional parental 
interest in the genetic father.
The intangible fibers that connect parent and 
child have infinite variety. ... It is self-evident 
that they are sufficiently vital to merit 
constitutional protection in appropriate cases. . . .
• • • •
The significance of the biological connection is 
that it offers the natural father an opportunity that 
no other male possesses to develop a relationship with 
his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and 
accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's 
future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child 
relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions 
to the child's development.
Id. at 256, 262. New York afforded Lehr adequate protection of 
his constitutional rights. "Whereas [Robertson] had a continuous 
custodial responsibility for Jessica, [Lehr] never established 
any custodial, personal or financial relationship with her." Id._ 
at 267, Mark and Crispina C.*s constitutional parental interests 
are greater than Lehr's. From even before the moment of 
conception, the C.'s assumed responsibilities for their son's 
future. They never slept on their rights, moving for declaratory 
relief immediately upon receiving Anna J.'s threat to withhold 
their child.
In Michael H. five members of the United States Supreme 
Court recognized the constitutionally protected interest of a 
■genetic parent in a parent-child relationship. Michael H. was 
the genetic father of Victoria, who was conceived with Carole D. 
through sexual intercourse while Carole D. was married to Gerald 
D. Michael H. v. Gerald D. . 491 U.S. 110, 113, reh'g denied, 492 
U.S. 937 (1989), and reh'g denied. Ill S. Ct. 1645 (1991), and 
motion to amend or clarify denied. 112 S, Ct. 1931 (1992).
Michael was precluded by California law from establishing a 
parent-child relationship with Victoria. Id.,, at 115; Cal.
Evid. Code § 621(a) (West Supp. 1992) ("the issue of a wife 
cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is 
conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage"). Only four 
justices determined the result to be constitutional because they 
found that a genetic father who conceived a child with a woman 
married to another man had no constitutionally protected parental 
interest. Michael H. . 491 U.S. at 113-32 (plurality opinion
by Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor and Kennedy,
jj., joining). Another four justices determined that 
California’s conclusive presumption was unconstitutional. See 
id, at 136-57 (Brennan, J. , dissenting, with Marshall and 
Blackmun, JJ., joining); i^ at 157-63 (White, J. , dissenting, 
with Brennan, J. , joining). The deciding vote was from Justice 
Stevens, who recognized a potential constitutional interest in 
Michael H.'s relationship with Victoria, but determined that the 
trial court had adequately considered awarding him visitation 
rights. Id. at 132-36 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
The California Supreme Court found that *'a majority of the 
justices [in Michael H. 1 were solicitous of the rights of unwed 
biological fathers. For them, the determinative factor was 
whether a biological father has attempted to establish a 
relationship with his child." Kelsey S. . 1 Cal. 4th at 837. "If 
an unwed father promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full 
commitment to his parental responsibilities—emotional, 
financial, and otherwise—his federal constitutional right to due 
process prohibits the termination of his parental relationship 
absent a showing of his unfitness as a parent." Id^ at 849. If 
anything, the constitutional rights of a genetic parent are even 
greater when that person is married to the other genetic parent, 
as is the case with Mark and Crispina C.
The California Court identified the following as important 
factors: "the father’s public acknowledgement of paternity,
payment of pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his 
ability to do so, and prompt legal action to seek custody of the 
child." Id. ; see also In re Babv Girl M. , 37 Cal. 3d 65, 73-75 
(1984) (recognizing constitutional parental rights of a genetic
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father so long as he maintains a relationship with the child and 
is not found unfit); Jermstad v. McNeils, 210 Cal. App. 3d 528, 
551 (1989) (finding constitutional parental rights in a genetic 
father who promptly acknowledges paternity and seeks custody of 
the child).
Mark and Crispina C. have publicly and consistently 
maintained their status as the genetic parents of Christopher. 
Anna J. concedes as much. The C.*s have never shirked their 
financial responsibilities toward Christopher. They only balked 
at Anna J, 's attempts to extort additional funds to satisfy her 
welfare obligations. The C.'s efforts to secure their legal 
rights as parents of Christopher have been prompt and tenacious.
5^ The Equal Protection Clause Requires That—Crispina—C_^ 
Rp npclared The Nai-nral And Legal Mother Of 
rhristopher. Because She Is Similarly Situated To Mark 
C.. Christopher's Natural And Legal—Father,^.
There is no genuine question about whether Mark C. is the 
genetic, natural, and legal father of Christopher. Christopher 
was conceived with Mark's sperm with the intention of all parties 
that he act as father in raising the child. Mark C. is not a
sperm donor. See supra, Part I.B.
in the "first surrogate parenting case to reach a California
appellate court," the surrogate was both gestational host and 
genetic mother, adoption of Matthev^, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1239, 
1250 (1991), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1685 (1992). The Court of 
Appeal ruled that denying the genetic father (Timothy) parental 
rights would be unconstitutional. M. at 1273. "Timothy's 
private interest stems from both his biological connection to 
Matthew and his conduct as Matthew's father. Matthew was 
conceived with the intention that Timothy would raise him, and
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Timothy has faithfully carried out his responsibility.” Id. The 
appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the 
surrogate's petition to withdraw her consent to the adoption of 
Matthew by Timothy's wife. at 1251. In a surrogacy
arrangement, the genetic father is the natural and legal ^ther.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that Crispina C. be 
found to be the natural and legal mother because she is similarly 
situated to her husband Mark.^
A legal preference for one sex over the other is "the very 
kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Reed v.—Reed,
404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (holding unconstitutional an Idaho statute 
favoring males over females in appointing administrators of 
estates). "[C]lassifications by gender must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 
197 (1976) (holding unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds 
an Oklahoma statute that set the age limit for purchase of 3.2% 
beer at 18 for females and 21 for males), reh'g deni^, 435 U.S. 
918 (1978); see also Michelle W. v. Ronald W^, 39 Cal. 3d 354 
(1985) (holding constitutional the denial of a stepfather's 
petition to prove himself the genetic father, because the child 
had already established a relationship with her mother's former 
husband) ("a sovereign may not subject men and women to disparate
5 "No state shall - . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. 
"A person may not be . . . denied equal protection of the laws 
. . Cal. Const, art. 1, § 7(a). California's constitutional
guarantee of equal protection is essentially the same as the 
federal constitutional guarantee. Cohan v. Alvord, 162 Cal. App. 
3d 176, 181 (1984).
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treatment where there is no substantial relationship between the 
classification and an important governmental purpose”), appeal 
dismissed. 474 U.S. 1043 (1986).
In Lehr. the United States Supreme Court recognized that 
equal protection requires that genetic fathers and genetic- 
mothers be treated similarly if situated similarly aside from 
gender. Lehr. 463 U.S. at 265-67. The Court has also held that 
requiring consent of mothers, but not fathers, in the adoption of 
illegitimate children violates equal protection. Caban. 441 U.S. 
at 382.
Crispina C. is situated differently from women in surrogacy 
arrangements where the husband is the genetic father and the 
surrogate is the genetic mother. For example, in the celebrated 
Baby M. case, William and Elizabeth Stern arranged for Mary Beth 
Whitehead to be artificially inseminated with William*s sperm.
In re Baby M. . 109 N.J. 396, 411-14, 537 A.2d 1227, 1235-36 
(1988) . The New Jersey court found that both William and 
Whitehead were the child's natural and legal parents, but 
affirmed an award of custody to the Sterns. Id. at 445, 459.
The court acknowledged the validity of an equal protection 
argument for the genetic mother's parental rights if a fertilized 
egg were implanted in another woman's body. Id^ at 4 50.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that contributors of 
both the sperm and the egg in the creation of a child are natural 
and legal parents, unless they duly relinquish their rights.
C. Anna J. Does Not Have A Constitutional Right To Be 
Declared A Natural Parent Of Christopher^
Although Anna J.'s contribution to the development of 
Christopher was significant, and although she retained a privacy
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interest in the pregnancy, she is not constitutionally entitled 
to parental status.
The United States Constitution implicitly guarantees various 
zones of privacy. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (a woman's 
right-to terminate her pregnancy), reh'a denied. 410 U.S._959 
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (dissemination 
and use of contraceptives); Griswold. 381 U.S. at 484 (same).
The California Constitution guarantees privacy expressly. 
Conservatorship of Valerie N. . 40 Cal. 3d 143, 161 (1986).* The 
right of privacy protected by cases such as Roe is the freedom 
from "compulsion to carry a fetus to term, to deliver the baby, 
and to care for the child in the first years of its life," Jed 
Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy. 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 789 
(1989) (arguing that constitutional privacy analysis must look to 
what the law requires a person to do, not to what the law 
prevents a person from doing). The right to physical autonomy 
during pregnancy does not include the right to withhold a child 
from his genetic parents when those parents have actively 
maintained their parental interests. See also Baby 109 N.J.
at 448, 537 A.2d at 1253 ("The custody, care, companionship, and 
nurturing that follow child birth are not parts of the right to 
procreation ....").
Anna J. argues that her biological investment in 
Christopher, owing to her bearing and nourishing the child for 
nine months, gives her parental rights. But parental rights are
* "All people are by nature free and independent and have 
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life 
and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and 
pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." Cal. 
Const, art. 1, § 1.
25
not determined on unjust enrichment theories. The "immediate 
right to the care, custody, management and companionship of . . .
minor children [is] far more precious . . . than property 
rights." May v. Anderson. 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (holding that 
a mother-in Ohio is not bound by the Full Faith and Credit_Clause 
to honor an ex parte Wisconsin decree awarding custody of 
children to the father). Anna J.'s physiological sacrifice in 
bearing Christopher was admittedly considerable, but it does not 
deprive the C.*s of parental rights with respect to their child,
nor does it confer parental status upon Anna J.
Of course, there are different circumstances in which a 
court will protect the parental rights of a birth mother. For 
•example, in Tn re Timothy W. , 223 Cal. App. 3d 437 (1990), the 
Court of Appeal recognized the fundamental right of a birth 
mother to raise her child, id. at 446-47, holding that when a 
mother releases her infant to the care of prospective adoptive 
parents, but has not yet relinquished the child for adoption, she 
retains the right to reclaim the child, id • 3t 441. Th 
circumstances of Alyssa W., the birth mother in Timothy, were 
very different from Anna J.*s. Alyssa was Timothy's genetic 
mother. Furthermore, neither of the prospective adoptive parents
in Timothy was genetically related to Timothy.
Nor .is Anna J. afforded parental rights under the Equal 
Protection Clause. She is not situated similarly to either Mark 
or Crispina C, True, both Crispina and Anna contributed 
physiologically to the development of Christopher, and both are 
women. But only Crispina is the genetic mother. She has an
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independent constitutional right to parental status, and an equal 
protection right to the same status as Mark's.
Anna J. has no constitutionally protected interest in being 
declared the legal parent of Christopher. The right to privacy 
does not confer upon a woman the right to terminate parental 
rights of genetic parents even if she carries and gives birth to 
their child. Nor does a gestational surrogate have parental 
rights equivalent to a genetic mother's by equal protection, 
because the two women are not similarly situated.
D. Even If The Constitution Confers Parental Rights On
Anna J.. The State Of California May Determine That
Mark And Crisoina C. Are The Natural Parents Of
Christopher.
Even if Anna J. has constitutional parental rights, the 
parental rights of Mark and Crispina C. are not diminished. 
santoskv, 455 U.S. at 754 n.7 (the fact that foster parents' 
rights may be affected does not justify denial of parental rights 
to natural parents).
Recognizing the parental rights of Mark and Crispina C. is 
consistent with opinions expressed by all justices in Michael H_^, 
491 U.S. 110. First, four justices explicitly found a 
constitutional interest in a genetic parent, id. at 141-42 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 157 (White, J., dissenting), 
and a fifth justice acknowledged there could be such a 
relationship, id. at 133 (Stevens, J. , concurring). Second, even 
the justices who did not recognize a constitutional right in a 
genetic parent determined that the State of California was 
entitled to determine the legal right of a.genetic parent. Id. 
at 118-30 (plurality opinion by Scalia, J.). The court did not 
find any constitutional right superior to that of a genetic
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parent. Third, both the trial court in Michael H. and the trial
court in this case awarded parental rights to a married couple,
thus promoting, the "unitary family." See id. at 123.
Granting parental rights to Mark and Crispina C. is
constitutionally acceptable. “
III. PUBLIC POLICY DICTATES THAT MARK AND CRISPINA C. BE
EXCLUSIVELY DECLARED THE NATURAL AND LEGAL PARENTS OF 
CHRISTOPHER.
Infertility affects one in six American couples of
reproductive age, and this figure is expected to increase. Terra
Ziporyn, 'Artificial* Human ^Reproduction Poses Medical.,_Social
concerns, 255 JAMA 13 (1986); Developments in the Law—Medical
TPchnoloav and the Law. 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1519, 1546 (1990). We
-now live in an era where a child may have as many as five
different potential parents. These include a sperm donor, an egg
donor, a surrogate or gestational host, and two non-biologically
related individuals who intend to raise the child. Hill, supra,
at 355. It is often the case that developments in the law are
outpaced by developments in science. Given the current and
potential developments of modern reproductive technology, the
courts must help guide our journey through this brave new world.
A. Parental Status Should Attach To The Persons Who Have 
Sought. Bv Whatever Means They Could Marshal,_To Cause
A Child To Be Born So That They Could Raise It And Care 
For It.
"[Wjith new conditions there must be new rules . . ,
Benjamin N. Cardozo, Nature of Judicial Process 163 (1947).
When [statutory] language is susceptible of more than 
one reasonable interpretation ... we look to a 
variety of extrinsic aids, including the ostensible 
objects to be achieved, the evils to be remedied, the 
legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous 
administrative construction, and the statutory scheme 
of which the statute is a part.
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Woodhead. 43 Cal. 3d at 1008. Gestational surrogacy is a new
condition. While there is a presumption that the woman from
whose womb a baby emerges is that baby's mother, that presumption
arose before there was any possibility that the source of the egg
and the -source of the womb could be different women. Furrow, et
al.. Bioethics: Health Care Law and Ethics 122 (1991).
■•'This Court has termed the interest in maintaining a 
parent-child relationship a compelling one, ranked 
among the most basic civil rights. Freedom from an 
incorrect imposition of the relationship on either 
parent or a child is an equally compelling interest."
Public policy mandates the use of the most reliable and 
objective evidence available to determine the parentage 
of a child whose interests are at stake in a disputed 
paternity proceeding. Such evidence is usually in the 
form of blood tests of the alleged father, the mother, 
and the child, which, based upon genetics, either 
exclude or include the alleged father in the group of 
possible fathers.
Everett v. Everett. 150 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 1064-65 (1984)
(quoting Salas v. Cortez. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 28 (1979) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)). That same public policy 
mandates the use of the most reliable and objective evidence 
available to determine the mother of a child where, as here, the 
issue of maternity is disputed.
Surrogacy is gaining in popularity for a variety of reasons. 
Scientific advances in the field of reproduction, a societal 
shift in conventional attitudes toward sex and the family, and 
the apparent shortage of babies for adoption all are reasons for 
such popularity. In short, surrogacy is in demand because people 
desire genetic continuity with their offspring and surrogacy 
enables them to satisfy that desire. Richard A. Posner, The 
Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate 
Motherhood. 5 J. Contemp. Health Pol*y 21, 22 (1989). Women who
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are unable to bear children themselves can now maintain genetic 
continuity with their offspring through in vitro fertilization 
and use of a surrogate.
The increasing use of such technologies has prompted our 
sister-states to address the surrogacy issue. For example-*- 
Nevada and Iowa specifically exempt surrogacy contracts from 
their general prohibitions against payment for adoptions, thereby 
legitimizing the arrangement by implication. Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 773 (West 1987); Iowa Code Ann. § 710.11 (West 1989). Arkansas 
has enacted legislation specifically determining parental rights 
in surrogacy cases, providing that: "A child born by means of 
artificial insemination . . . shall be presumed to be the child 
of the woman giving birth . , . except in the case of a surrogate 
mother. in which event the child shall be that of: (1) The 
biological father and the woman intended to be the mother if the 
father is married, . . Ark. Stat. Ann. § 9-10-201 (1991)
(emphasis added).
While other states have attacked the validity of the 
surrogacy contracts themselves, none has denied parental rights 
to the genetic parents. See, e.g. . La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2713 
(West Supp. 1988); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 199.590 (Baldwin 1988); 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21, 200 (1988); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 63-212(i) 
(West 1988).
When a genetic parent entrusts his or her issue to another 
to carry the child to term, the genetic parent maintains a 
compelling interest in a relationship with the child. Hill, 
supra, at 393. Part of what makes parenthood meaningful is the 
parent's ability to see her child grow and develop and see
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herself in the process of this growth. "[A]doption cannot 
satisfy the yearning to create the child and to watch as a 
version of oneself unfolds and develops," Id, at 389,
It is the procreators, Mark and Crispina C., the couple 
responsitdr^ for bringing the child into the world with the ~ 
intention of raising it, the prime movers in the procreative 
relationship, who are the parents of the child at birth. Id. at 
387. They have brought together their sperm and egg through in 
vitro fertilization, and they have selected the individual who 
will carry the child they intend to raise. Id. at 414. Mark and 
Crispina are the "first cause in the procreative process." Id, 
They have engineered the birth of Christopher. The others in the 
process are participants only after the intention and actions of 
Mark and Crispina, the intended parents to have a child. While 
some gestational host is needed to achieve the intention of the 
intended parents, no particular carrier is necessary. The 
gestational tie is only one way in which to bring a child into 
the world. It is not the gestational tie itself which is 
fundamental, but the pre-conception intention and the pre- and 
post-conception acts which bring the child into existence. See 
Id. at 414-15.
B. The Alternative Reproduction Act Of 1992 Is Evidence Of
California's Public Policy Accepting Gestational
Surrogacy.
The Alternative Reproduction Act of 1992 is instructive 
regarding current public and social policy in California. See 
Legis. Counsel's Dig. of SB 937 (1991-92 Reg. Sess.). Although 
in passing Senate Bill 937, the Legislature felt that existing 
law needed clarification to provide for the regulation of the
31
process by which infertile persons may become parents through a 
surrogate or through the use of a donated egg, the Governor felt 
that these situations were adequately covered by existing law. 
Ainsworth, supra.
The policy underlying Senate Bill 937 was to expressly allow 
surrogacy in California, The bill contained various provisions 
for clearly determining the rights of individuals involved in 
surrogacy situations:
(1) The bill provided: "[T]he Legislature finds and 
declares that surrogate contracts are not against sound 
public and social policy."
(2) The new Civil Code section 7003 would have been amended 
to include subdivision (d), establishing the parent and 
child relationship "between a child and acknowledged 
(intended) mother , , . by a properly executed 
surrogate contract."
(3) Section 7302(d) would have declared:
An ovum donor shall have no parental rights 
. . . with regard to any child conceived or 
born pursuant to the use of the ovum . . . 
except where the ovum donor is the 
acknowledged (intended) mother. An . . .
(intended) mother ... is the mother of a 
child conceived or born pursuant to the use 
of the . . . ovum regardless of whether the 
. . . ovum is deposited into her own 
reproductive system or [that] of a surrogate.
(4) Section 7303 would have read: "The . . . (intended) 
father shall be presumed to be the father of any child 
born to a surrogate within 300 days of conception 
pursuant to a surrogate contract."
(5) Section 7306 would have read: "Payment made to a 
surrogate . . . does not constitute a violation of
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section 181 or 273 of the Penal Code" (prohibiting 
payment for adoptions or for relinquishments of 
parental rights).
(6) Section 7309 would have read:
— In the event an . . , (intended) mother's —
ovum ... is used by a surrogate, the ovum 
is conclusively presumed to be the ovum of 
the . . . (intended) mother and no adoption 
is required. Furthermore, the intended 
parents shall be conclusively presumed to be 
the legal parents. . . . The surrogate . . . 
shall have no parental rights to the child.
Legis. Counsel's Dig. of SB 937 (1991-92 Reg. Sess.).
Although the Governor vetoed this bill, he did so on belief 
that existing law could adequately govern surrogacy situations. 
His veto in no way negated or contradicted the public and social 
policies underlying the bill. The Alternative Reproduction Act 
of 1992 passed both the Senate and the Assembly in August of 
1992. The vote in the Senate was 22 in favor, 13 against, while 
the vote in the Assembly was 49 in favor and only 19 against. 
Senate Weekly History, Oct. 9, 1992, at 244 . The wide margin by 
which the bill passed both legislative houses is indicative of 
the strength of the policy determinations contained within the 
bill.
C. In the Absence of Legislation On the Books Declaring
Gestational Surrogacy Impermissible. It Is Not For the
Courts To Cut Off Solutions Offered Bv Science.
A mere one percent of all surrogates change their minds 
about relinquishing the child. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood:
The Challenge for Feminists. 16 L. Med. & Health Care 72, 74 
(1988) . In contrast, seventy-five percent of the mothers who put 
up their children for adoption change their minds and keep the 
child. Id. at 76. This suggests that giving up a child pursuant
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to a surrogacy agreement, where the surrogate knows before she 
becomes pregnant that the child is not hers, causes less distress 
than does giving up one's own child to be adopted and raised by 
others.
Ij3—medicine, innovations are adopted when there is some 
sense that it may be an improvement over the existing treatment 
and it will not be likely to cause risks that outweigh its 
potential benefits. A similar approach should be taken in the 
law of gestational surrogacy. The harms that have been posited 
thus far about gestational surrogacy are not concrete enough to 
require that the procedure be banned. Presently, most of the 
articulated evils are speculative; therefore, this new procedure 
should be allowed to continue forward under regulation in order 
to assess the harms, if any, that may or may not materialize.
See Lori B. Andrews, Legal and Ethical Aspects of New 
Reproductive Technologies. 29 Clinical Obstetrics & Gynecology 
190, 193 (1986).
Anna J. argues that permitting surrogacy encourages the 
exploitation of women, especially poor women. This is mere 
speculation. There is no evidence that surrogate mothers are 
drawn from the ranks of the poor, and it seems unlikely that they 
would be. Posner, supra. at 25.
Moreover, this argument is counterintuitive. A couple would 
be unlikely to want a desperately poor woman to carry their baby; 
they would be concerned about both her health and the baby's.
Id. Anna J. is a well educated professional. (R.T. 784.) She 
was not exploited or forced by the sweet smell of financial gain. 
She volunteered to be a surrogate for the C.'s. In fact, it was
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Anna who initially approached the C. 's and offered to be their 
surrogate. (R.T. 781-84.)
Modern reproductive technologies are not likely to have a 
more devastating effect on the family than any other medical and 
social phenomenon. Given the countless other pressures operating 
on the family, the so-called threats of in vitro fertilization 
and gestational surrogacy are minuscule.
CONCLUSION
Statutes, constitutions, and public policies converge to 
determine that Mark and Crispina C., a married couple and the 
genetic parents of Christopher, are the natural and legal parents 
of Christopher. Although Anna J,*s physiological contribution to 
the development of Christopher was significant, it does not 
warrant invasion of the natural family of Mark, Crispina, and 
Christopher C. Mark and Crispina are the procreators who 
engineered the birth of Christopher, the prime movers responsible 
for bringing him into this world with the intention of raising 
him. Declaring Mark and Crispina C. the natural and legal 
parents of Christopher is both just and legally required.
For the foregoing reasons. Respondents pray this Court to 
affirm the Court of Appeal and hold Mark and Crispina C. the 
natural and legal parents of Christopher.
Dated: November 4, 1992.
Respectfully submitted,
Jeffrey B. Linden
Tim Reagan
Counsel for Respondents
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